India-Bangladesh Relations at a Crossroads: The Fallout of Sheikh Hasina’s Exile and China’s Growing Influence

Let me start by asking about Professor Yunus’s visit to China. He invited China to invest more in Bangladesh, and they discussed the Teesta River Restoration Project as well as maritime cooperation. Bangladesh and China had a close relationship even under Sheikh Hasina’s government. But back then, this didn’t seem to strain India-Bangladesh ties. Given the current situation, would you agree that enhanced cooperation between Bangladesh and China could put even more pressure on India-Bangladesh relations?  

China has always been a key development and political partner of Bangladesh, as you mentioned, even under the previous regime. In fact, since China recognised Bangladesh after the assassination of Mujibur Rahman in 1975, the relationship has only grown.

To put this visit into perspective, particularly for your Indian audience: The Bangladesh government initially sought a bilateral meeting with Prime Minister Narendra Modi. If I understand the Chief Advisor’s thinking correctly, his preference was to hold the first bilateral meeting with India, our nearest neighbour. Unfortunately, that has not materialised.

Only when it became clear that a summit with India was not going to take place did the Bangladesh government finalise the dates for the trip to China. It could have happened the other way around—India first, then China. If you look at recent history, when Professor Yunus came to power, Delhi reached out at the highest level, and he responded by accepting an invitation to speak virtually at the Southern Conference. That was a reciprocal gesture. Later, there was a meeting with India’s Foreign Minister in New York on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), which I attended as part of the delegation. After that, your Foreign Secretary visited Dhaka.

Given these developments, many of us logically expected a summit-level meeting between India and Bangladesh. But now, we know that India is not responding positively to our request. So, once it became clear that the first bilateral visit would not be with India, the government moved ahead with China.

In China, the reception was overwhelming. The Chief Advisor attended the Boao Forum, met top government leaders, spoke to students, and was awarded an honorary doctorate. Multiple agreements were signed covering trade, economic cooperation, and free market access for Bangladesh once it exits the LDC (Least Developed Country) category. The talks also included discussions on the Teesta River and broader Belt and Road cooperation.

With India cutting back on visas for Bangladeshi patients, Bangladesh is now considering direct flights between Kunming and Chittagong to facilitate medical travel to China.

As you pointed out, there seems to be a feeling in Bangladesh that the onus for improving relations now lies with India. What does India need to do?  

The answer is simple: India needs to do some soul-searching. What went wrong?

The Indian government gave extraordinary and unconditional support to the ousted government, and many Bangladeshis hold India responsible for sustaining what they saw as an autocratic and kleptocratic regime. If India wants to reset or rebalance the relationship, it first needs to reflect on its past approach and acknowledge whether mistakes were made.

The second issue is more immediate. As long as the fugitive former prime minister remains a factor in the bilateral equation, improving relations will not be easy—if not impossible. Hosting a former prime minister is one thing, but allowing that individual to engage in political activity from exile is entirely different. That would be seen as a hostile act.

So, these are the two key issues: first, retrospection, and second, removing the fugitive prime minister from the equation.

I’d like to explore your point that India needs to introspect. What do you think India failed to understand about the changing situation in Bangladesh?  

Those who shaped India’s approach to Bangladesh primarily viewed it through a security lens. Even when they considered development projects and connectivity, they still framed them in security terms.

It is understandable to establish red lines, such as ensuring that neither country’s territory is used for insurgencies or attacks. But in pursuing this security-driven approach, India ended up providing legitimacy to a government that conducted three fraudulent elections in a row.

While many international partners were cautious about engaging with such a government, India offered unconditional support. As a result, Bangladeshis hold India responsible for enabling the former prime minister’s excesses.

India’s mistake was investing exclusively in the Awami League and its leadership while neglecting other stakeholders—civil society, the private sector, and the opposition. Now that the Awami League is gone, India has lost its primary interlocutor in Bangladesh.

What is more concerning is that even after the debacle of August 5, 2024, when our former prime minister fled to Delhi—or somewhere in India—India’s narrative did not change. The power brokers, whether in the South Block or elsewhere, are still holding on to that same perspective instead of reflecting, recalibrating, and rearticulating the relationship.

You can see it in how the Indian media circulates fake news and half-truths. Yes, there have been attacks on religious minorities and others, but most of those targeted were politically associated with the ruling party. However, exaggerating these incidents has not helped the situation.

Even when the Chief Advisor, just a few weeks ago, spoke about integrating the Seven Sisters (northeastern Indian States) through subregional cooperation, there was little response from India. It is becoming increasingly clear that the Indian side is no longer interested in strengthening ties with the current government—even though it is a legitimate administration, moving toward elections.

You have spoken about how the Indian government supported Sheikh Hasina through thick and thin and continues to do so. But this has a history, doesn’t it? During the years when the BNP [Bangladesh Nationalist Party] was in power, India faced several security concerns from Bangladesh. The red lines you mentioned—about not using each other’s territory for attacks—were not strictly followed. So, it’s not as if India supported Sheikh Hasina out of nowhere. Is there an acknowledgment of this in Bangladesh?  

Bangladesh has seen various governments—Ershad’s, Khaleda Zia’s, and Sheikh Hasina’s. As has India. But as citizens of another country, we do not try to influence or dictate what kind of government India should have. Similarly, India must learn to accept and work with whatever government the people of Bangladesh choose instead of artificially propping up or endorsing a regime that lacks popular support.

This approach can backfire. Never before in our history has anti-India sentiment been this high. Why? Because people believe that Delhi bears collateral responsibility for sustaining Sheikh Hasina’s rule. Now, that perception may not be entirely accurate, but perception is reality in politics. Even India’s External Affairs Minister recently acknowledged in a Parliamentary discussion that they were aware of the growing anti-Hasina sentiment but felt unable to act. What is striking is the inability to take that realisation to its logical conclusion.

You have repeatedly used the word “impose”. What do you mean by that? India didn’t elect Sheikh Hasina…

That’s exactly the problem—nobody elected Sheikh Hasina for 15 years. Yet, our big neighbour acted as though she was at the top of the world. She was endorsed, celebrated, and legitimised by India, even when other global powers—OECD countries, the US, and others—were more cautious.  

Bangladesh is being courted by, and in turn is engaging with, two of India’s biggest geopolitical rivals—China and Pakistan. Considering Bangladesh is now reviving its ties with Pakistan and Professor Yunus has just completed an extensive visit to Beijing, doesn’t this suggest that both sides bear some responsibility? What can Bangladesh do to address this?  

Let me take a step back. When Bangladesh purchased two submarines from China, similar security concerns were raised—this was during Sheikh Hasina’s tenure. Individual countries will naturally have security concerns, but that shouldn’t come at the cost of jeopardising the security dynamics of their neighbours.

The real issue here is that for every problem—bilateral, multilateral, or regional—we need a platform for dialogue. We need spaces where concerns can be flagged, perspectives can be heard, and mutually agreed-upon actions can be taken. But by refusing to engage with our head of government, India has lost an opportunity to do precisely that.

India has made similar missteps before. Look at Nepal. When India imposed a blockade, it lost an entire generation of goodwill in Nepal. The same pattern has played out in Sri Lanka as well. So, let’s acknowledge that India’s approach to its neighbours has often been counterproductive.

Now, I say this with humility—I am not in a position to advise a country as large, experienced, and competent as India. But I do think this is a moment to reflect, not just on bilateral relations, but on how we can improve collectively. We are in a post-Trump world, where global relationships are in flux, from Gaza to Greenland, from Gaza to Greece. Where does South Asia fit into this changing order?

But on March 26, Bangladesh’s National Day, Modi wrote to Yunus, stating that India remains committed to advancing the partnership, based on mutual sensitivity to each other’s interests and concerns. How does Dhaka perceive this?

It was a well-articulated statement and much appreciated. It was a National Day statement—it’s a diplomatic ritual. But at the end of the day, the real test is in action, not words.

First, there’s the economic reality. Trade is ongoing. Indian contractors continue working on various infrastructure projects. The Line of Credit (LOC) is slow-moving, but it’s still in place. The economic engagement continues. Then there’s the second reality—a surreal one. This is where a strong anti-India sentiment exists among sections of the Bangladeshi population.

So, realism and surrealism coexist in Bangladesh today. The country is undergoing a kind of catalytic transformation—a sublimation of all the negative emotions that have built up over the past 15-17 years, along with the historical baggage that precedes it.

India’s External Affairs Minister, S. Jaishankar, recently informed Parliament that there were 2,400 incidents of attacks on minorities in Bangladesh in 2024 and 72 incidents in 2025. Would you say these figures are exaggerated?  

There are multiple ways to calculate such incidents. Nobody denies that after the departure of the former prime minister, law and order weakened significantly. The police force was in disarray. For a time, security fell to the Army and paramilitary forces, but the situation was unstable.

Additionally, many religious minorities in Bangladesh have historically supported the ruling party—previously the Awami League. So, in some cases, it’s difficult to separate whether an attack was targeted at a Hindu individual for their faith or because they were a political supporter of the Awami League.

However, there’s another aspect to consider. Religious minorities in Bangladesh—such as Hindus and Buddhists—are part of the majority in India. Similarly, religious minorities in India—such as Muslims—are a majority in Bangladesh. So, when India comments on the treatment of minorities in Bangladesh, it must also acknowledge that its own treatment of minorities has repercussions.

If I may ask, as a member of a minority community in Bangladesh, how secure do you feel?  

I may not be the best example. I have been a refugee in India twice—first from 1964 to 1967 after the riots in the 1960s and again in 1971 during the war. But my parents never left Bangladesh. I returned, invested in my homeland, and built my life here. I left prestigious international positions to contribute to my country.

My family has deep ties to Bangladesh’s political and judicial history. My mother was a Member of Parliament from Sheikh Hasina’s party, and my father was a Supreme Court judge appointed by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. But these personal connections don’t affect my professional and fact-based perspective.

Personally, I accept the risks of staying in Bangladesh, but I believe such risks exist for any citizen in any country where identity politics plays a role. I also believe that a significant section of Bangladesh’s society remains committed to secularism, human rights, and the protection of all minority communities—Hindus, Christians, Buddhists, ethnic minorities in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and indigenous groups in the plains. This commitment to inclusion is the essence of nation-building.

When discussing nation-building and the presence of secular, progressive forces in Bangladesh, how do you interpret recent developments in the country? Specifically, the proposed Constitutional changes that suggest dropping the word “secular” in favour of “pluralism?” Additionally, some are downplaying Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s role in history books. 

First, regarding the Constitution, this is a commission report—it is not a final decision. It is one of many inputs in an ongoing political process. Overreacting at this stage is premature, as it is still under review.

Second, in any democratic society, people hold different views. Some express extreme positions out of ignorance, ideology, or political gain. If I were to judge India solely based on some voices that call Bangladeshis “termites”, it would be unfair to the Indian government and society as a whole. Similarly, some people in Bangladesh seek to rewrite history, but that doesn’t mean their views will define national policy.

I want to move on to the other major topic you flagged at the beginning—Sheikh Hasina’s reported presence in Delhi. Can Bangladesh ever move beyond the demand that India should send her back? Is this a serious demand?  

I believe the demand for extradition is serious because the judicial process and the International Criminal Tribunal have already begun investigations. Case dossiers are being prepared, and the Attorney General’s and prosecutor’s offices are working on it. In fact, Bangladesh is seriously considering taking the case to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Various avenues are being explored, and legal proceedings will move forward with or without her presence.

However, there is another question regarding Sheikh Hasina’s presence in India. One thing is providing refuge to a person for humanitarian reasons. Another is allowing that individual to engage in politics while benefiting from the hospitality of the host country. Imagine if the Dalai Lama were to give daily speeches on human rights violations in China—how would Beijing react?

This is precisely what is happening. We have made it clear on multiple occasions, including through official channels, that while granting her refuge is India’s decision, she should not be allowed to conduct “megaphone diplomacy”—making public statements, using digital platforms, and interfering in Bangladesh’s internal matters. When this happens, the host country also bears some responsibility for the consequences.

Going back to the Awami League—will they be allowed to participate in the elections?

As I said, the government has made it very clear that the party itself will not be banned. However, there is a strong demand for its ban, and the Chief Advisor has acknowledged that. The stance is that those responsible for wrongdoing will face legal action, but the party as a whole is not being banned.

At this moment, the focus should be on ensuring a free, fair, participatory, and inclusive election. The Awami League’s involvement or absence is not the biggest challenge. In fact, dwelling on their participation could be a distraction, given that they themselves are not ready for it, and their leadership may not even allow them to engage in the process.

Elections will happen—the Chief Advisor has made that very clear. They will take place by the end of this year or, at the latest, by June next year. In the meantime, necessary reforms will be implemented, and the judicial process will run parallel to that.

The real question is whether India will be part of the solution or continue to aggravate the problem.

If India’s approach is dictated by domestic political calculations, then, frankly, that’s a dangerous path.

This paints a rather gloomy picture…

Not at all! We see this moment as a positive development. Changing a government through public upheaval is a major achievement for the people of Bangladesh.

But when you say the country is undergoing a catharsis, and then we see incidents like the burning of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s house—it sends a troubling signal.

Yes, the burning of that house was absolutely wrong—there is no doubt about that. But we must also ask: what drives people to such extreme actions? Extreme reactions like this do not emerge in a vacuum; they stem from deep-rooted grievances. These actions are not justifiable, but they do need to be understood.

That’s a dangerous line of reasoning—it’s something we hear in India as well, whenever riots break out. People say, “It’s just emotions”.

Every country has these moments—it’s not unique to Bangladesh. I don’t want to point fingers, but India has seen similar situations. The important thing is to approach such moments with understanding and care, rather than exacerbating tensions by focusing only on the consequences while ignoring the causes.

My appeal, through you, to your readership, is this: the well-meaning people of India and Bangladesh have nothing to do with the turmoil created by political actors. They have a shared history, geography, and even psychology. The question is—are we missing an opportunity to strengthen that shared future?

One of the biggest casualties of this crisis has been the loss of people-to-people contact. Earlier, there were academic exchanges, literary events, medical tourism—all of which have stopped. 

Yes, these are unfortunate collateral damages. They need to be corrected.

India, with its history, education, and diplomatic sophistication, should not be stuck in the past. But for the last six or seven months, its approach to Bangladesh has been dictated by its past relationship with Sheikh Hasina. The same people who formulated Indo-Bangladesh relations through the prism of Sheikh Hasina are still shaping policy today, and they have not updated their perspective. That is unfortunate.

But trade is still continuing, isn’t it?

Yes, both formal and informal trade continue. India is our second-largest trading partner after China. We rely on Indian imports for essential goods, industrial materials, and our garment sector. At the same time, Bangladesh’s exports to India have been growing, thanks to India’s generous duty-free, quota-free market access.

So, the economic front remains vibrant. But politically, restrictions on movement—such as the lack of visas for businessmen—are creating barriers. This is where politics is disrupting economic ties. It’s time to address these issues and move forward with mutual respect.

By mid-2026, Bangladesh-India relations will likely be on much firmer ground. The real concern is: what kind of baggage will we carry forward from this period? Will we come out of it with deeper mistrust, or will we use this moment to rebuild?