‘India Likely to Intensify Efforts to Name and Shame Pakistan on International Forums’: Yaqoob-ul-Hassan

New Delhi has been talking tough. Given what happened in the aftermath of the Uri attack (2016) and the Pulwama strike (2019), do you see any possibility of a major response from India after the Pahalgam attack?

India is poised to respond. The only question is the nature of the response. New Delhi has set the norm by responding to what it calls cross-border terrorism after Uri and Pulwama. It can’t afford to dither. If it does, the BJP would face domestic backlash.

India-Pakistan relations have suffered a serious setback with the Pahalgam attack. But are the dynamics at play different this time?

Yes, the Pahalgam attack has further strained bilateral relations between the two nuclear neighbours. However, this time, the nature of the relationship is markedly different. During previous episodes of tension, external powers—notably the US, China, and several Middle Eastern states—actively intervened to mediate and de-escalate the situation. In contrast, there now appears to be little willingness among external actors [except Iran] to step in and facilitate dialogue, leaving the two states to navigate the crisis largely on their own.

Another critical aspect is that, during earlier crises, channels of communication between New Delhi and Islamabad remained open. These backchannel and diplomatic contacts not only contributed to diffusing tensions after the Pulwama incident but also culminated in the 2020 ceasefire agreement [a renewal of the November 2003 ceasefire at the Line of Control].

No major thaw in bilateral relations appears likely in the coming months; instead, ties are expected to deteriorate further.

Even during an unprecedented crisis, nation states keep some channels of communication open. With India now placing the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in abeyance, has a red line been crossed and a new one drawn?

India’s decision to place the IWT in abeyance signals that it has crossed what Pakistan considers a red line. However, India’s choice to suspend—rather than terminate—the treaty suggests a strategic intent to revisit and renegotiate the terms of the IWT, rather than to abandon it altogether.

In the longer term, India is likely to intensify its efforts to “name and shame” Pakistan at international forums and ensure that Pakistan is isolated on the global stage. Conversely, Pakistan is expected to focus on keeping India bogged down in Kashmir, seeking to sustain international attention on the region and complicate India’s strategic calculus.

What about the China factor and its flagship programme, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and the massive investments inside the Pakistan territory?

The CPEC is already under significant duress. A full-blown insurgency in Balochistan and the resurgence of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province [formerly North West Frontier Province] have raised serious questions about the long-term viability of the project. In the near future, we may witness a further rise in attacks, particularly in regions where key CPEC routes pass through, such as KP and Balochistan. However, I do not foresee any immediate direct impact on China’s broader Belt and Road Initiative.

Can Beijing rescue Islamabad during the present crisis?

There is a potential for a quid pro quo involving the Brahmaputra river. China is likely to monitor the escalation of tensions between India and Pakistan very closely. Yet, in the immediate term, it appears unlikely that Beijing will take retaliatory measures against India over the Brahmaputra issue. Moreover, the Brahmaputra is not just a bilateral matter between India and China; it also significantly affects Bangladesh, where China has growing geostrategic and economic interests. This broader regional calculus will likely restrain China’s approach.